Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to

thank you and the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify this

afternoon. I do have a formal statement which I would appreciate

it if it could be incorporated into the record, but I would make only

a brief statement.

I think I should preface my remarks with the

fact that you cannot have an Iraq policy that works without a new

policy in dealing with the Arab-Israeli peace issue, without rethinking

your policy toward Iran, and without broadening our diplomacy,

which has focused in the last 2 years almost exclusively on

the peace process to consider how you can buildup a stronger basis

of support in the southern gulf.

But if I may address your question, is Saddam better off today,

the answer is yes, in some ways. There is one area where he is

clearly not better off. If you look back at the rate of arms imports

that he had until the embargo in mid-1990, by now he would have

spent anywhere from $22 to $45 billion on arms imports. He has

not had any major imports of arms since mid-1990, although there

has been smuggling, and some technology transfer.

In spite of demonstrations of prototypes, there has been no serial

production of a single major weapons system within Iraq. There

has been the assembly of some T–72 kits. I think we have only to

think what would happen in the United States if we froze the technology

base for 10 years, if we could not have reacted to the lessons

of the gulf war, and if our military establishment consisted of worn

equipment that was used in the Iraq-Iran war, in large part, before

it was certainly worn in the gulf war.

In terms of weapons of mass destruction, it is an unfortunate reality

that during the gulf war we had only a limited number of successful

strikes on these facilities. Nevertheless, the gulf war forced

UNSCOM into Iraq, and we should not discount what happened.

Several billion dollars’ worth of manufacturing facilities, weapons,

and technology, was physically destroyed.

As you pointed out, however, his technology base remains. It is

virtually certain that he has had a decade in which to improve that

technology base. Certain key aspects of that base, particularly the

production of centrifuges and advanced biological weapons, could

never be traced by UNSCOM, which raises further questions about

UNMOVIC. He has the stockpiles to probably create a significant

break-out capability, and rapidly deploy some of these weapons.

In economic terms, the benefits to him are clear. Since 1990 economic

sanctions have eroded to the point where Iraq has at least

$1 billion worth of uncontrolled income from smuggled petroleum

exports. Its legal oil revenues in 2000 are estimated at roughly $22

billion, which is about 90 percent higher than they were the previous

year, and 170 percent higher than the year before that.

It is clear even from reports that focus on the hardship of the

Iraqi people that he is succeeding in controlling how these imports

of humanitarian goods and medical goods are used. They are going

to the elite. They are going to urban areas. They are not going to

the Shiites, they are not going to the center, and they are not going

to the Kurdish population that is not in the Kurdish security zone.

It is equally clear that consumer goods, some of them luxury goods,

are going to the elite around Saddam, to senior officers in the Republican

Guards, and to the security forces.

As a result, I believe that we should refocus actions to concentrate

on long-term efforts to ensure Saddam cannot import conventional

weapons, and that technology and equipment to produce

weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the phrase, ‘‘smart

sanctions,’’ is not by itself a policy, even in dealing with Iraq, and

there are seven areas where I believe we are going to have to

change that policy.

First, we will never have consensus that restricts the flow of

arms and military technology to Saddam Hussein. There are too

many suppliers. There are too many types of dual-use items. There

are nations, North Korea, Russia, and China, which have cheated

on every arms control agreement that they have participated in. To

make smart sanctions work at all, there are two price tags, and

they still will not ensure any kind of leak-proof regime.

One is a massive intelligence effort to trace what is happening

on the part of supplier nations and entities. The other is something

we have not been good at in the past, confrontational diplomacy

that will really go to countries which violate any controls and confront

them and possibly sanction them under other laws targeted

to deal with these specific imports. It is very easy to talk about intentions,

but the whole history of proliferation is that broad agreements

simply fail.

Second, I think we should come to grips with the fact that at this

point in time, even if we could get UNMOVIC back into Iraq, and

Saddam has shown no signs of the willingness to permit this, it

might well do more harm than good. The history of similar regimes,

particularly the IAEA, even when we had inspections, was

that they were willing to basically certify Saddam was in compliance

by saying they could not find evidence he was not in compliance.

We have not had aggressive inspections since early 1997 and,

quite frankly, I do not believe a U.N. regime would get the political

support to have such inspections. Furthermore, I think it is simply

too late to find the dispersed cells and operations which have been

built up since the mid-1990’s.

Where I do disagree with Senator Kerrey and, I think, others of

the panel, is I do not believe that focusing on the Iraqi opposition

is no more than a forlorn hope. It would be nice if it could develop

military capabilities. It would be nice if it had the support of the

countries in the region. It would be nice if it had resonance inside

Iraq. I do not believe it has that support. I think the other panelists

here disagree with me, but for many of the people in the region,

they are a tool that would divide Iraq, and certainly the

Saudis and the Kuwaitis have raised issue to me at some length.

The Turks fear them as a way of dividing Iraq and creating a

Kurdistan.

I wish, again, this situation was different. I recognize that at this

point in time the United States has major problems in generating

the kind of patient, systematic, covert effort to develop internal opposition

that might work. Unless we do this, however, I think we

will find ourselves legislating the funding of a forlorn hope.

Fourth, as has been previously mentioned, I think we made a

massive foreign policy mistake in not confronting Saddam and in

not refuting the lies that he told over a 10-year period. I can think

of only two statements from the State Department that ever systematically

attempted to explain what was happening under oil for

food, and who the true cause of many of Iraq’s problems were. One

was a glorified publicity release, and the other was a page-and-ahalf

long.

In contrast, every day, Saddam has fought for the minds of the

Arab world. He has been able to capture the hardship issue. He

has been able to find, among people who do not understand Iraq,

many supporters that blame the United States and sanctions for

actions which are more those of Saddam than any impact of the

U.N. Unless we are willing, now, to try to recover smart sanctions

will simply be a step forward toward no sanctions, and the question

really is, can the State Department have that kind of effort.

Fifth, and I say this in my testimony, the United States must

think now about the future of Iraq’s Kurds. I was in the U.S. Embassy

in Iran in the early 1970’s. I watched the United States support

the Shah of Iran in using the Kurds as a political tool. I

watched them abandoned after the Algiers Accord. I think we must

have a clear policy toward autonomy, clear demands as to what

Kurdish rights should be.

And to go back to the no-fly zones, I would absolutely agree that

if we withdrew from Turkey, we withdraw from any protection of

the Kurds, and whether the result is an immediate occupation and

slaughter, or the kind of more patient and systematic killing which

Saddam has used on other occasions, those are the only two alternatives.

Sixth, we talk about smart sanctions, but I have not heard anything

about energy. In our projections we say, in the Department

of Energy, we want Iraq’s production capacity to increase from

roughly 2.8 million barrels a day today to 6.2 million in 2020, and

we see Iraq as a critical component of our future energy strategy.

It is far from clear that that makes sense, but somebody has got

to resolve the issue.

Finally, we need to revitalize the other aspects of military containment.

One key goal is to improve and maintain the forward

presence rapid-deployment capabilities and war-fighting capability

we have today.

Another goal is to stop preaching. We have got to stop issuing

strong statements and then not following them up with decisive

military action. The best description I can give of military options

under the Clinton administration was that the President spoke

stickly and carried a big soft. I wish there were some better or

nicer way to put it, but we need a formal doctrine that states our

‘‘red lines,’’ that states quite clearly what we demand in terms of

gulf security, that we will remain committed to military containment and close commitment with our gulf allies as long as there

is threat from Iran and Iraq.

We need to define the kind of Iraqi action that would lead us to

launch military action and, if Iraq does take such action, we need

to strike so hard and so decisively that the military and political

costs to Saddam will outweigh the political propaganda gains he

makes from small pinprick strikes. In short, we would be much better

off if we struck once every 2 years in ways which have a crippling

impact on some part of Saddam’s military machine, than

through endless, pointless missions against air defense targets he

can reconstitute.

We also have to persist to the point where we are successful.

What we did on September 16 was to carry out half a strike with

no followup. We did not send a message of decisive action. Our

message, I suspect, to Iraq and the gulf was we may have hit a

third of our targets. That is not victory.

Thank you.

A decade ago, under a different President Bush, we emerged out of a major foreign

policy crisis in the Middle East with the most advantageous position we had

had since World War II. We had led a broad coalition to victory against Iraq. In

the process, we demonstrated that we could be a strong and reliable friend of the

Arab world, and we created many of the conditions that made a search for a comprehensive

Arab-Israeli peace process possible. We created the conditions for military

containment of both Iran and Iraq, we had the firm support of our European

allies, and we built bridges to Russia and China that allowed us to act together in

dealing with peace and security issues in the Middle East.

We now face a foreign policy crisis in the Middle East under another President

Bush that Secretary Powell’s visit can only begin to deal with. Part of that crisis

is not of our making. The Middle East is all too correctly described as a region

where nations, ‘‘never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.’’ Its leaders also

tend to repeat the mistakes of the Bourbon dynasty in France, of which it was said,

‘‘They forgot nothing and they learned nothing.’’ We have, however, made many serious

mistakes of our own, and much of our present foreign policy crisis in the region

is the result of self-inflicted wounds.

Iraq is one key area where we made such mistakes, but Iraq cannot be discussed

without touching upon the Arab-Israeli conflict and our policy towards Iran. In the

case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we face months and probably years of backlash

from the failure to create a peace between Israel and Syria and between Israel and

the Palestinians. It may not be fair, but all sides blame the US for the failure to

reach a peace over the last two years. The Arabs feel that the US tilted far too much

towards Israel, and was not an honest broker. Many Israelis feel that the US rushed

them into concessions that simply led to more Syrian and Palestinian demands and

which could have compromised Israel’s security. Both sides give us much of the

blame for the Second Intifada, and in many Arab eyes we are almost as much to

blame for each Palestinian casualty as Israel.

Even in the eyes of some of our most sophisticated Arab allies, and the leaders

of their countries, they feel we rushed a peace process forward as part of President

Clinton’s effort to redeem himself, we failed to consult, we did not listen to warnings

that we played with fire in trying to force compromises across basic differences in

goals and values, we created false expectations, and we had no exit strategy to deal

with failure. There is a feeling that President Clinton acted as a political opportunist,

and there is broad resentment of the tendency of senior officials like Secretary

Albright to issue moralistic pronouncements and ignore the need to consult

and listen.

The end result is that Saddam Hussein has a powerful new weapon to use against

the US, as do Iran’s hard-liners and every extremist in the Middle East. Nations

outside the region can play the peace and Second lntifada cards against us, as nations

like France, China, and Russia do. In Saddam’s case he attacks every moderate

Arab regime as the ally of the US, and therefore the ally of Israel. He provides

cash payments to every Palestinian casualty of the Intifada at a time no Arab moderate

regime has kept its promises of aid to the Palestinian Authority, and he couples

the hardships of the Palestinians to the hardships of his own people.

Is this fair? Of course not! All sides in the region are far more to blame for their

problems than we are. Should we tilt towards the Palestinians at the expense of

Israel? Never! We will score no lasting successes, and earn no enduring gratitude,

by favoring one set of allies at the expense of another and those who truly oppose

us and our values cannot be appeased.

What we can do, however, is to change the context of our policy towards the Arab-

Israeli conflict in ways that Secretary Powell may already be attempting. First, we

can get out of the middle and stop trying to force the pace. We can actually stop

and seriously listen to our allies in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia as well as

Israel. We can pay serious attention to the views of Europe, and try to bring Russia

actively back into the peace process.

Second, we can clearly define our policy towards Israel. We can make it clear that

no amount of threats or outside pressure will block the flow of aid and our commitment

to Israel’s security. At the same time, we can make it equally clear that our

commitment is to Israel and not to the government of the day. Hopefully a unity

government will emerge in Israel that will continue to seek an end to violence and

which will act prudently and pursue peace. If, however, the Sharon government

moves towards extremes, does not sincerely support the search to end violence and

a move back towards a peace process, and offers the Palestinians and Syria no way

out, we should react accordingly. We should clearly and openly oppose it on these

issues without reducing our strategic commitment to Israel in any way.

More broadly, the Bush Administration can provide added humanitarian aid to

the Palestinians. It can also firmly oppose the kind of political opportunism that

seeks to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem before there is a peace, or which

tries to legislate that the same Palestinian leaders we need in trying to end the violence

should be treated as terrorists.

Iran is another key player in this strategic game. It is a counterweight to Iraq,

and its moderates and the faction that supports President Khatami offer some hope

that Iran will evolve to the point which it plays a constructive role in the region.

This does not mean that the US should tilt towards Iran to counter Iraq. We should,

however, realize that the same steps we should take to revise our policy towards

the Arab-Israeli conflict will undercut the hard-liners and extremists in Iran. We

should not soften our diplomatic opposition to Iran’s opposition to the peace process

and Israel’s very existence, support of the Hizbollah and violent Palestinian extremists,

to Iran’s proliferation, and to Iran’s build-up of its military capabilities to

threaten the flow of shipping and oil through the Gulf.

At the same time, we recognize that President Khatami and his-supporters do

represent a major political shift, and take every valid opportunity to create correct

diplomatic relations and a government-to-government dialog. We should support the

Saudis, other Southern Gulf states, and Europe in trying to create relationships

that encourage moderate Iranian behavior.

We should allow the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to sunset and revoke the executive

orders that block trade and energy investment in Iran. These sanctions have not

affected Iran’s behavior in any way. They have cut us off from Iran’s moderates and

business class, they have strengthened hard-liners in demonizing us, they have encouraged

Iran to proliferate, and Iran has steadily increased its real arms imports

and military expenditures since they were passed. Strategically, they have limited

Iran’s ability to maintain and expand its energy exports at a time when an increase

in world oil production capacity is critical to limiting the rise in energy costs.

This brings us to Iraq, and we need to recognize that there are no easy and quick

solutions. To being, we need to understand that no other nation in the world believes

that Saddam Hussein’s tyranny is fragile, or will support us in military adventures

to overthrow his regime, even if we are willing to attempt them. No regime

in the region trusts Saddam or is free from fear of him, but key allies like Kuwait,

Saudi Arabia, and Turkey regard the Iraqi opposition outside Iraq as weak, divided,

and venal. They record the support that the Congress and Clinton Administration

gave to movements like the Iraqi National Congress as a political farce that has little

real support beyond Washington’s Beltway and the lobby of the Dorchester

Hotel. They fear these games could drag them into dangerous and unpopular military

adventures, divide Iraq in ways that would favor Iran’s hard-liners, and end

in a ‘‘Bay of Kurdistan’’ similar to the Bay of Pigs. Many other Iraqis who do oppose

Saddam also regard the Iraq Liberation Act and its selective aid to part of the opposition

as the kind of overt US support that labels all outside opposition as traitors.

There is a good case for mounting a systematic covert operation to try to overthrow

Saddam’s regime. There is an equal case for working with our allies—particularly

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—to say that we would waive reparations and debt

repayments if a new regime overthrew Saddam. We should also work with our regional

allies to find some common approach to Iraqi Kurdish autonomy that we can

advocate to protect the Kurds. The plain truth of the matter, however, is that

Saddam’s regime is not fragile or unpopular with Iraq’s military, security forces,

and elite. Saddam also now has enough revenue from smuggle oil exports and his

manipulation of oil for food to buy all of the support he needs. His supporters now

live in relative luxury and economic sanctions hurt only the Iraqi people.

This says a great deal about the future of sanctions. We have absolutely no

chance of unifying the UN Security Council around revitalizing economic sanctions

or creating support for controls on energy investment in Iraq. France, China, and

Russia will oppose us and so will every Arab state and developing nation. Regardless

of what Iran, Jordan, the Kurds, Syria, and Turkey say, they also will not crack

down on Iraqi petroleum smuggling. Here, the Clinton Administration has also left

the Bush Administration with a devastating legacy.

The Clinton Administration never took an effective lead in trying to really make

oil for food work and to ensure that the plight of the ordinary Iraqi was eased. It

made few efforts to counter Saddam’s endless propaganda effort to exploit the hardship

of his own people, and the efforts it did make were so sporadic and lacking

in depth as to be totally unconvincing. Few in the Arab world know that nearly half

of the flow of goods under oil for food have been held up or manipulated by

Saddam’s regime.

It is simply too late to win this aspect of the battle for the minds of the Arab

world, although the Bush Administration has every incentive to carry out a systematic

effort to refute Saddam’s charges, make it clear that he is the principal problem

in oil for food, and that he systematically lies about the causes and scale of Iraq’s

health problems, infant mortality, and other social problems.

The US can still, however, work with its allies to make sanctions what Secretary

Powell has called ‘‘smart,’’ or ‘‘narrow but deep.’’ Many nations will join us in opposing

any lifting of the sanctions on Saddam’s arms imports, and imports of dual-use

items to make conventional weapons, missiles, and weapons of mass destruction.

Other supplier and exporting nations will join in if they receive the ability to make

energy investments, can carry out wide ranging civil trade, and can exploit other

business opportunities. Arab leaders can justify such efforts to their people both on

the selfish grounds they aid their national security and on the broader grounds they

prevent Saddam from diverting funds away from Iraq’s true economic needs.

There are several key components to a new US approach to dealing with the US

foreign policy crisis in the Middle East. First, US must redefine its military position

in containing Saddam. The US must make it clear that its military presence in the

region is tailored only to deterring military adventures against the Kurds and other

states, is the minimal force required, and works in consultation with Turkey and

our Arab allies. It must repeatedly explain the size and role of our forces in depth,

and it must explain every military action in equal depth. The day we could simply

announce air strikes as part of enforcement of the No Fly Zones is over. So is the

day we could trivialize our military action or describe them as business as usual.

Even the best Pentagon briefings—and they have generally been horribly vague and

inadequate—are not a substitute for leadership from the President and Secretary

of State on this issue, or for detailed consultation with our allies. Moreover, when

we act, it should be for a clear purpose and so decisively that it truly deters Saddam,

and not be at a level where any military damage we do is offset by Saddam’s

ability to use it for propaganda purposes.

Second, we should not give up totally on resuming UN inspections and bring

UNMOVIC back into Iraq. However, we must not have any illusions and continue

to treat Iraqi proliferation with the Clinton Administration’s ‘‘benign neglect.’’ In the

real world, it has been three years since UNSCOM could really carry out effective

inspections and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) never really challenge

Iraq as effectively as it should. UNMOVIC may be a useful deterrent to open,

large-scale Iraqi action but it does not have the leadership or international support

to really carry out effective inspections and find the kind of covert cells and new

Iraqi efforts developed over the last three years. If anything, UNMOVIC could simply

become the political cover for a UN effort that said it could find no evidence

of Iraqi efforts. We need to decouple the containment of Iraq’s proliferation from the

issue of UN inspection. We need to provide a comprehensive picture of what Iraq

is doing and the risks involved, and make it clear that inspection is not going to

be an answer to sustained military containment. If we do not, we will send mixed

and ineffective signals, and we may well see the UN turned into a tool that will

give Saddam a false blessing and a license to proliferate.

Finally, we should recognize that key Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia feel irritated

and neglected. They cannot openly express their contempt for the Clinton Administration,

but they feel it deeply. They see the last few years of President Clinton’s

efforts to rush forwards towards a final Arab-Israel peace settlement as the act of

an opportunist who pressures them for his own political advantage. They feel they

came under intense pressure from his Secretary of Energy to increase production

and cut oil prices, reacted by making quiet concessions, and were then embarrassed

in public while he tried to run for Vice President. They feel the US ignored Saudi

efforts to create an institutionalized dialogue between importers and exporters that

could help create fair and stable prices. They feel Clinton’s Secretary of State and

Secretary of Defense lectured them, rather than consulted, and never really listened.

The Saudi’s also feel Clinton’s trade representative deliberately ignored their

efforts to join the WTO. We do not need to sacrifice a single US interest to consult

with our Gulf allies, listen to them, and engage in a balanced diplomacy that gives

them the priority they deserve. Secretary Powell has already advocated such a balanced

diplomacy and he is all too correct in doing so.

Secretary Powell’s call for ‘‘smart sanctions’’ against Iraq is long overdue, and can

help to correct a critical weakness in our foreign policy. It was clear by the mid-

1990s that broad economic sanctions were not going to bring down Saddam Hussein,

halt Iraqi efforts to proliferate, or cripple the ability of Iraq’s military and security

forces to repress the Kurds, put down Iraq’s Shi’ite opposition, and threat Kuwait

and Saudi Arabia. It was equally clear that they continued to impoverish the ordinary

Iraqi, and block Iraq’s economic development.

Nearly half a decade later, sanctions have eroded to the point where Iraq has over

one billion dollars of uncontrolled income from smuggled petroleum exports. Its

‘‘legal’’ oil revenues in 2000 are estimated at $21.6 billion, which is 89% higher than

in 1999, and more than 170% higher than in 1988. Saddam can now use a combination

of this income and the holes in the controls on the UN oil for food program,

to buy the loyalty of his power elite, the security forces, and Republican Guards.

It makes good, and long overdue, sense to refocus the sanctions effort to ensuring

Saddam cannot import conventional arms and the technology and equipment to

produce weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it is equally clear that

‘‘smart sanctions’’ are not enough and that the Bush Administration could easily repeat

some of the most chronic failures of the Clinton Administration. The US needs

more of a strategy than can fit on a bumper sticker, and more thought than can

fit in a fortune cookie. To be specific, ‘‘smart sanctions’’ can only work if they are

part of the following seven major changes in US policy towards Iraq:

*First, the US must be prepared to confront potential and actual suppliers.* It is

uncertain that the US can get even pro forma Security Council agreement to

refocusing sanctions in ways that give them real teeth. The waters and borders

of Iran, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey are not going to be sealed, and dual-use

items and military spare parts are notoriously hard to police. It will take a massive

intelligence effort and confrontational diplomacy with suppliers, and the

nations on Iraq’s borders, to make ‘‘smart sanctions’’ work. Talk and good intentions

are cheap; effective action is difficult and costly.

*Second, the US must come to grips with the failure of the UN inspection effort*

*and the fact UNMOVIC might do more harm if it did return to Iraq than good.*

Effective UN inspection really halted in late 1997, and Desert Fox did virtually

nothing to really inhibit Iraq’s effort to proliferate. Iraq has had years to create

an effective network of cells and dual use efforts to develop a break out capability

in chemical and biological weapons, improve its nuclear weapons designs,

and develop a missile program. UNMOVIC is still banned from Iraq, but if it

did return, it might well operate under so many political constraints that it

would end up certifying Iraqi compliance, rather than act as an effective deterrent

to Iraqi action. The Clinton Administration dodged this issue for its last

two years in office, but ‘‘smart sanctions’’ require a clear and detailed plan of

action.

*Third, the US must face the reality of the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi opposition,*

*shift to a long-term covert operations effort, and focus on the continuing need for*

*military containment.* The Bush Administration threatens to repeat the mistakes

of the Clinton Administration and Congress, and go on backing weak and

unpopular elements of the Iraqi opposition like the Iraqi National Congress.

These movements have no meaningful support from any friendly government in

the region, and they have no military potential beyond dragging the US into

a ‘‘Bay of Kuwait’’ or ‘‘Bay of Kurdistan’’ disaster. The Turks fear them as a

way of dividing Iraq and creating a Kurdistan, and the Arabs fear them as a

way of bringing Iraq under Shi’ite control and/or Iranian influence. Worse, they

are no substitute for a major covert effort to overthrow Saddam from within,

and overt US funding of such movement tends to label the Iraqi opposition as

US sponsored traitors. We need to understand that containing Iraq is far more

important than legislating the funding of a forlorn hope.

*Fourth. the US must launch an actite truth campaign to confront Saddam on*

*oil for food and all of the other issues where he relies on lies and exploitation*

*of tensions in the region.* The Clinton Administration committed a massive foreign

policy mistake by failing to engage Saddam over his lies and propaganda.

Aside from some sporadic and truly inept press efforts, it allowed him to capture

Arab and world opinion in lying about the problems in oil for food and the

true causes of the suffering of the Iraq people. It did not engage him actively

on human rights inside Iraq, his attacks on Iraq’s Shi’ites, his continuing claims

to Kuwait, or his threats to Iraq’s Kurds. It postured about palaces to the American

media, and allowed Saddam to turn UN reporting into a propaganda defeat.

‘‘Smart sanctions’’ will not work without a massive and continued truth

campaign to fully explain the true character of the Iraqi regime that is tailored

to Gulf, Arab, and world audiences.

*Fifth, the US must think now about the ultimate future of Iraq’s Kurds.* The erosion

of sanctions poses immediate threats to Iraq’s Kurds. While the Clinton

Administration chose to ignore it, Iraq has been ‘‘cleansing’’ oil-rich areas in

Northern Iraq of Kurds and forcing them into other areas or the Kurdish security

zone. It is not clear we can prevent this, but getting support for ‘‘smart

sanctions’’ and protecting the Kurds means we need a clear US policy on the

future of the Kurdish security zone and a definition of Kurdish autonomy that

will set policy goals to protect the Kurds while defusing fears Iraq will divide

or break up.

*Sixth, the US must have a clear energy policy towards Iraq.* Iraq is a nation that

has some 11% of all the world’s oil reserves and that has not had any coherent

energy development efforts since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980.

US government projections call for Iraqi oil production capacity to more than

double from around 2.8 million barrels a day to 6.2 million barrels in 2020.

These increases in Iraq’s oil exports are also critical to any hope of its economic

development. Massive energy investments are required, and take years to a decade

to pay off. They also can provide the Iraqi regime with major new resources.

‘‘Smart sanctions’’ must be coupled to a clear energy development policy.

*Finally, the US must revitalize the other aspects of military containment.* The

true subtext of a ‘‘smart sanctions’’ policy is that we will need a major forward

military presence, rapid deployment capability, and war fighting ability to check

an Iraqi attack on Kuwait or threat to use weapons of mass destruction indefinitely

into the future. The Clinton Administration spoke stickly and carried a

big soft. It ‘‘nickel and dimed’’ its use of force to contain Iraq, issued a series

of abortive threats over UN inspections, launched Desert Fox, and then halted

it before it could be effective. Two years of pin-prick strikes over the ‘‘No Fly

Zones’’ have done as much to give Saddam a propaganda victory as they have

to hurt his air defenses.

We need a formal Bush Doctrine that states our redlines, that says quite clearly

that Gulf security and the continued flow of oil is a vital US national security interest,

and that we will remain committed to military containment and close cooperation

with our Gulf allies as long as there is a threat from either Iraq or Iran. We

need to define the kind of Iraqi action that will lead us to launch military action,

and if Iraq takes such action, we need to strike so hard and so decisively that the

military and personal cost to Saddam is so unaffordable that any political propaganda

gains he makes are minor in comparison. The one round of half-successful

strikes the Bush Administration launched on February 16th is Clintonesque at best.

‘‘Smart Sanctions’’ require a clear Bush Doctrine and a clearly defined commitment

to decisive force.

Senator, I think it would not be mine. I think

you have to be very careful about saying rules of engagement for

aircraft. What you would then mean is the daily aircraft we fly

would presumably do even more, every time they were illuminated,

or they saw a movement in ground-based radars, to engage individual

systems or find some daily proxy to attack. We backed away

from that last summer. Let me note that the rules of engagement

have already changed.

But the problem is, these changes do not really do anything. At

the end, virtually the entire Iraq air defense system remains. Saddam

can provoke an attack at the time and place of his choosing.

He can often do it in an area which produces collateral damage, or

serves his own political purposes.

I think the real issue has to be that if you are going to attack

at all, you must attack with sufficient force so you do him real

damage. That does not mean daily, or new rules of engagement. It

means that you allow a cumulative process of Iraqi action to buildup.

You use this as a reason, and then you strike to the point

where you take out a significant percentage of his air defense assets,

or you strike at your targets like Republican Guards headquarters.

I do not think you can fix any aspect of the no-fly zone

patrols by simply saying, this is strengthening day-by-day rules of

engagement.

Much more selectively and much more rarely.

Go in hard, take the political cost, which is roughly the same as

if you conducted a minor strike, wait, and then hit him again if he

reconstitutes. But, do not do this in some sort of rigid game where

he can pick the way in which we respond and when we do it.

The problem is that we often end up attacking

the opposition when we should be noting that Saddam is a strong

and competent tyranny with a core of very effective military forces

which are heavy, well-armored, which have fought well against

much better organized opponents at the regional level.

I think we sometimes forget how different the gulf war was relative

to what happened in the Iran-Iraq war. Because of that, I do

not believe that you can create an effective military opposition

without massive American participation. I think you would have to

have forces based in Turkey and defensive forces in terms of their

ability to operate really out of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait does not have

the basing capability that would approach several wings.

You would need a massive battle management support. It would

not be an extension of what exists today in the no-fly zones. You

would have to be prepared, frankly, to deal with the consequences

of what happens if the opposition should lose, and I strongly suspect

they would lose. I have heard many reports of defections and

weaknesses and assassination attempts and coup d’etat attempts,

and I have listed quite a number of them in my books, but the fact

is, he is still there, and at least some of those coup d’etat attempts

never happened.

The other thing that we have not talked about and has to be

borne in mind is, are we really talking about unilateral war? Are

we going to bring Turkey along into this equation? Is Saudi Arabia

going to play, in spite of its stated fear of division? What is Kuwait

really going to do?

The last time I was in Kuwait talking to the opposition—and I

am afraid the history of that conference was not a happy one—I

was talking to someone who claimed to be a commander in the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. In listening to his

call for American air support—and coming from an Iranian-backed

opposition this was interesting—it was quite clear he may have

been well able to launch small attacks inside southern Iraq, and

carry out pinprick attacks on the regime. But, he had absolutely no

idea whatsoever about what it meant to actually confront a modern

force and to deal with air power.

And let me note, there has to be an aftermath to military action.

We have found out the hard way that unless you have an almost

unified opposition arise, you have a massive exercise in nation-building,

so when you begin with the military dimension you had

better be prepared to go on with all of the economic and other aid

required, something we have not done in Bosnia, and something we

certainly have not done in Kosovo, and if we are going to set a

precedent, so be it, but it will be the first one.

Senator, a very few quick points. One thing I

think we all agree on is that people really need to understand that

smart sanctions will at best only work if you have strong and decisive

military containment. Strong and decisive military containment

means military action, and the willingness and demonstrated

ability to protect Kuwait, the Kurds, and halt any major deployment

of weapons of mass destruction.

If we do not have that commitment, smart sanctions are, indeed,

a road to no sanctions. I do not believe the Bush administration

would make that choice, but it is a point to remember.

I do not believe the opposition today can be made strong or popular

enough to overthrow Saddam. I do not necessarily disagree

with what Richard has said, but any effort to support the opposition

has to be very well contained, without military adventures,

without creating the equivalent of a Bay of Pigs. I do not believe

you can create a Contra movement, which was not universally popular,

as I remember it, in Congress on a bipartisan basis.

But more than that, we have forgotten the fact we cannot act in

a vacuum. This is not some game board. What about Turkey? What

about Saudi Arabia? What about Jordan? What about Syria? What

kind of structure of alliances does it take to really make this work,

as distinguished from having Saddam use it to discredit the opposition

as tools of America, and use it to gain popularity in the Arab

world, and you had better answer all of those questions before you

start anything that you may not be able to finish.